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* For purpose of identification only.
“The views expressed in this presentation are those of 
the author and do not reflect those of the Department 
of Defense or the US Government.”
NPS is the Navy’s Research University.
Monterey, CA — 1500 students
• US Military & Civilian (Scholarship for Service & SMART)
• Foreign Military (30 countries)
Graduate Schools of 





• Cyber Academic Group
National Capital Region (NCR) Office
• 900 N Glebe (Ballston)/Virginia Tech building
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Digital information is pervasive in today’s society.
There are many sources of digital information:
• Traditional Systems: Desktops, Laptops
• “Mobile:” Tablets, Cell Phones, embedded systems
• Internet-Based Services (servers)
Government has many possible uses for this information:
• Establish possession of contraband information (child pornography, credit card #s)
• Recover stolen information
• Document a conspiracy (stock fraud; murder-for-hire)
• Investigation, intelligence & analysis
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Digital forensics makes this evidence available.












Digital forensics makes this evidence available.


























My team develops better approaches for automation and 
analysis — “big data for little devices”
Identify high-value data (automatically).
—Contacts, calendar, GPS, documents
Correlate devices with identical or similar data.
• Previously unknown organizations or connections
Present
• Make the results understandable
Translate with human language technology (HLT)
• Apply to ةةييببررععللاا ,תִירְבִע, español, 汉语/漢語, ⽇日本語, svenska, etc.
Archive and Manage our holdings
• Make use of institutional knowledge.
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1. Work with “big data”
—Scale is our advantage — use it!
—Many techniques developed on small data sets do not scale
—We discover important techniques by working with a big corpus!
Three principles underly this research
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1. Work with “big data”
2. Automation is essential.
—Today most forensics is done manually — this doesn’t scale.
—We develop techniques & tools for automation.
Three principles underly this research
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Navy Cyber Defense Operations
1. Work with “big data”
2. Automation is essential.
3. Concentrate on bulk data.
• Leverage data that are fragmented and incomplete
—Deleted and partially overwritten files
—Fragments of memory in swap & hibernation
—Tool marks
• These techniques can be applied to files
Three principles underly this research
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corresponding to deleted files, the restart markers are
searched. After identifying any of the seven restart markers,
all the bits prior tomarker position are discarded and resulting
data is merged with the first part of the file or with the header
extracted from the original JPEG file and decoded. Recovered
files are displayed in Fig. 5. It can be seen that fragments of the
original file can be successfully recovered. It should be noted
that because the stored image size in the header is not
modified, in all cases images appear in the right size, but the
content is shifted.
5.2. Recovery of stand-alone fragments by use of pseudo
headers
Obviously without a valid header, a JPEG file or a part of it
cannot be decoded. Given this fact, in this section, we pose the
question of what information one will need to reconstruct
a pseudo header that can be utilized in decoding of a stand-
alone file fragment. The information that can be inferred by
analysis of encoded file data will not be sufficient to recon-
struct a file header. Our premise is that image files stored on
a recovery medium will be interrelated to some extent. This
relationmay exist because imagesmay have been captured by
the same camera, edited by the same software tools, or
downloaded from the same Web pages. All these factors
induce different levels of shared information among the
neighboring files in terms of their encoding properties which
may vary from image quality settings to specifications of the
encoder. Therefore, in essence, we will investigate the
possible use of encoding related information from recovered
files in recovery of stand-alone fragments.
Considering only baseline JPEG/JFIF images, the most
common JPEG encoding method used by most digital cameras
and on the Web, the information needed to encode/decode an
image can be categorized into four types. These are:
1. the width and height of the image specified in number of
pixels;
2. the 8! 8 quantization tables used during compression;
3. the number of color components and type of chroma sub-
sampling used in composition of MCUs; and
4. the Huffman code tables.
Decoder essentially needs image size so that the number of
MCUs can be computed and the image blocks obtained by
decoding of each of the MCUs can be laid out at their proper
locations on the image. Since the encoded values are not the
quantized values, but the associated quantizer bin values,
quantization tables are needed to perform de-quantization
prior to inverse-DCT transformation. The composition of
Fig. 5 – Recovered files after erasure of random amounts of data from tail (upper left), center (upper center and right), and
both header and tail parts (lower row) of the original image.
d i g i t a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n 6 ( 2 0 0 9 ) S 8 8 – S 9 8 S95
Sencar and Memon [2009] DFRWS
MISSING JPEG TOP
MISSING JPEG BOTTOM
Digital forensics (DF) research is different from from both 
traditional computer science and DF practice.
DF research is different!
• DF research is hard and expensive — but it looks easy!
• DF is practitioner driven — most DF developers are not professional programmers
• Most practitioners are not computer scientists — don’t understand data
• DF has immediate needs of great significance (kidnapping, defense, etc.)
Managing a research corpus is harder than managing case data
• Practitioners will analyze each data once
• Researchers repeatedly re-analyze data as tools improve
• Sharing 60TB of data is hard — and sharing is part of research
DF software development is challenging
• Tools must constantly improve and evolve
• Research tools must be “product quality”
• Researchers don’t get exemplars when tools crash
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“Lessons Learned Writing Digital 
Forensics Tools” 
DFRWS 2012
This talk presents “lessons learned” while managing a 
significant corpus and writing DF tools.
Quick intro to Digital Forensics
The Real Data Corpus
Lessons learned writing DF tools
• DFXML — a language for describing DF products
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Digital forensics makes digital evidence 














Lessons learned managing a 
research corpus
Real Data Corpus, Harvard University, 2006
≈ 800 drives
My first purchase of six used computers yielded:
• A law firm (client-attorney documents)
• A mental health practitioner (patent records)
• A single, divorced mother (child support disputes)
• A novelist (unfinished manuscript)
• + 2 more!





A lot of confidential information was being
inadvertently released!
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In the 1990s I started buying used computer equipment.
I only had three years of funding
There is a thriving used HD market
• Re-used within an organization
• Given to charities
• Sold on eBay
I used forensics for “usable security”
• Deletion patterns can show “intent”
My goal — show how usability failures 
became security failures
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In 2002 I started the PhD program at MIT CSAIL
I bought 250+ drives the first year
I stored “disk image” as GZIP-compressed raw files on a single server.
Critical technology for 2006
• Handling read errors from subject drives.






640GB RAID Array (2003)
The presence of private information showed sanitization 
failures. It’s condition showed user intent.
I scanned for “private information” with strings(1) and grep(1)
• Example: email addresses ; credit card numbers; SSNs; DOBs
Entire corpus re-processed each time tools improved
• Law enforcement — typically processes each drive once
Manually examined drives that had lots of email addresses
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No drives should have a lot of CCNs. 
By definition, all of these drives are interesting. 
Example: CCNs on hard drive images.
Drives in corpus, ≈2005
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I traced 20 drives back to their former owners.
While tracing back the drives, I discovered cross-drive analysis.
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We documented a significant problem with the secondary 
market.
• Garfinkel, S. and Shelat, A., 
"Remembrance of Data Passed: A 
Study of Disk Sanitization Practices," 




Some of reactions to this research were confused.
“Good luck [recovering] data from this.”
“Our prognosis: drive slagging is a fool-proof method to prevent data 
recovery.”
• It’s easy to remove data from a hard drive
—You just have to do it!
After the initial findings, this research moved in 4 directions
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Corpus management: Technical Issues
I imaged 250+ drives the first year
I stored images as raw.gz
• naturally led me to stream-based forensics
Lessons learned:
• ATA is hot-swappable
• Don’t maintain software (aimage)
that does the same thing as other
open source software (guyimager)
Critical technology:
• Handling read errors










imagedDrive imaging workstation, Harvard University
2005
Lesson: Make the most of the tools that you have; 
follow technical innovations they force upon you.
Lesson: read the documentation   
for the computer that you are using
Law enforcement typically process each image once, then archives
We store data online so we can reprocess.
What works best:
• simplicity — a single file with all metadata embedded
• convenience — small file names with short paths (ease of use)
• permanence — file names and path names that wouldn’t change
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Using disk images for research required storing data online 
for easy access.
640GB RAID Array (2003) 1.5TB RAID Array (2006)
6TB XServe RAID (2008)
72TB RAID (2012)
Automation is key; any process that involves manual record keeping is going to 
introduce inaccuracies that will be hard to detect and correct.
Useful data will outlive any storage system, so make provisions to move the 
data when you design the system.
Data storage formats: better is no assurance of success.
In 2005 I started on AFF (Advanced Forensics Format):
• Store metadata & data together; Extensible
• Read & Write, but optimized for archiving
• Advanced support:
—digital signatures, encryption, chain-of-custody
• aimage imager that did “sparse imaging” and error recovery 
AFF4 addressed workflow, metadata, and efficiency issues
Since 2010 I have given up on AFF:
• E01 can now handle terabyte-sized HDs in a single file
• Joachim Metz’s ewfacquire & libewf do an excellent job supporting E01
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Avoid replicating other people’s work
Avoid “Not Invented Here” research.







Since joining NPS the “non-US corpus” has grown 
substantially.
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Drive corpus — good geographical diversity.
28
Today we have 100-200 mobile devices.
More diversity, but less representative of the market.
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Samsung Feature: 4
Samsung Smart:  22
HTC Feature:     4
HTC Smart:      10
SONY Feature:    6
SONY Smart:      4
Nokia Feature:  18
Nokia Smart:     5
Motorola Feature:2
Motorola Smart:  1
LG Feature:      2
LG Smart:        3
Dell Windows:    2
Sharp Smart:     1
T-Mobile Feature:1
Huawei Smart:    1
O2 Windows:      1
Bad ATA drives crash Linux & FreeBSD
Crashes look like wild memory writes.
• ATA spec allows DMA to system memory
• Motherboards probably don’t defend against wild DMA.
Question:
• Can we use this as a memory acquisition technique?
• There is “legacy ATA” on many motherboards.
Many bad drives had sensitive data!
• Always read to the “end” of the drive
• Read all the drives in the RAID set
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Many technical options remain unexplored.
Drives with some bad sectors invariably have more 
sensitive information on them than drives that were in 
working condition when they were decommissioned.
Corpus Management — use descriptive path ames
Many different modalities:
• Disk images — “drives”  • Packet Dumps — “net”
• Memory Images — “ram”  • Files — “files”
• Scenarios — symlinks to source images
Many different sources and distribution restrictions:
• Used purchased inside US — “US” (not used by USG)
• Used purchased outside US — “NUS”
• Created by NPS, redistributable — “NPS”






Although it is advantageous to have names 
that contain no semantic content, it is 
easier to work with names that have some 
semantic meaning.
Names must be short enough to be 
usable but long enough to be distinct






Every data object should have a unique file name.
• Put something very descriptive in the file name
—Source country
—Scenario name
• Don’t change file names.
—If you must change names, try to have the old name inside the new name
ubnist1.E01 -> nps-2009-ubnist1.E01
• It’s okay to change directories.
Different users want different subsets of the corpus.
• It’s best if they use the same file hierarchy.
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Place access-control information as near 
to the root of a path name as possible.
Anti-virus and indexing cause numerous problems
Disable AV and indexing on your corpus.
• Forensic data has viruses
• Corrupt and unstructured data frequently crash indexers
Exceptions need to be frequently reapplied:
• After software updates
• After OS upgrades
• When new external HDs are attached.
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Configure anti-virus scanners and other indexing tools 
(e.g., Apple’s build_hd_index) to ignore directories that 
might contain raw forensic data.
There is no good way to distribute a 60TB data set
Approaches we have tried:
• Transferring over the Internet by scp, rsync, BitTorrent, uftp, Aspera
• Sending 2TB internal SATA drives
—Need SATA dock.
—File System Choice: ext2/3/4? HFS? NTFS?
—(NTFS seems best choice for read-only)
Added complications — “bit rot” long term storage — off track writes
—Evaluating the Impact of Undetected Disk Errors in RAID Systems
https://www.perform.csl.illinois.edu/Papers/USAN_papers/09ROZ01.pdf
—Modeling the Fault Tolerance Consequences of Deduplication
https://www.perform.csl.illinois.edu/Papers/USAN_papers/11ROZ02.pdf
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Solutions developed by other disciplines for distributing large files rarely 
work well when applied to DF without substantial reworking.
Corpus management — Policy issues
— Privacy 
— Illegal content — financial, passwords and copyright
— Illegal content — pornography
— Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)
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Even if something is legal, 
you may wish to think twice 
before you do it.
 Privacy  — What’s legal isn’t necessarily right.
Information in the RDC is not legally “private” 
• “The reasonableness of a search for Fourth Amendment purposes ... turns upon the 
understanding of society as a whole that certain areas deserve the most scrupulous 
protection from government invasion. There is no such understanding with respect to 
garbage left for collection at the side of a public street.” 
—CALIFORNIA v. GREENWOOD, 486 U.S. 35 (1988)
• In practice, we avoid disclosing PII because doing so would be wrong.
Copyright on user-generated material — different from privacy!
• Users do not transfer copyright to us, but we do have some rights in our copy
• “First Sale” doctrine — “In our view, the copyright statutes, while protecting the owner 
of the copyright in his right to multiply and sell his production, do not create the right to 
impose, by notice, such as is disclosed in this case, a limitation at which the book shall 
be sold at retail by future purchasers, with whom there is no privity of contract.”
—Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908)
• “Fair Use” — four part test.  1) purpose of the use (non-profit educational); 2) nature of 
the copyrighted work; 3) The amount of the work that is copied; 4) the impact of the use 
on the market value for the copyrighted work.
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Illegal content — different kinds requires different rules.
“Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act”
• Passed by Congress in 1984
• Outlaws possession of “access devices” with intent to commit fraud.
• Financial information (credit card numbers) and passwords are access devices.
• The key issue is intent — I don’t have the intent do defraud.
Copyright — rely on “Fair Use” (17 USC §107)
• Four part test.  1) purpose of the use (non-profit educational); 2) nature of the 
copyrighted work; 3) The amount of the work that is copied; 4) the impact of the use on 
the market value for the copyrighted work.
• The RDC doesn’t impact the value of the data, and it’s non-profit.
Conventional pornography
• The RDC has lots of pornography in it
• No access given to minors
Obscenity (e.g. child pornography)
• We can’t determine if something is really child porn...
• Names “suggestive” of child pornography are removed.
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Never sell access to the corpus.
Do not give minors access to real data.
Do not intentionally extract pornography 
from research corpora.
Institutional Review Boards — get to know the IRB.
In the United States, federally funded research involving human subjects 
must be reviewed by an accredited Institutional Review Board.
• “Human subject” means a living individual about whom an investigator conducting 
research obtains:
—Data through intervention or interactions with the individual, or
—Identifiable private information
• “Research” means “a systematic investigation, including research development, testing 
and evaluation, designed to develop or contribute to generalizable knowledge.” 
Options:
• Make the RDC public (so it’s not private)
—That would be unethical
• Don’t do “research”
• Get IRB approval (and that’s what we do)
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IRBs exist to protect human subjects, but 
many have expanded their role to protect 
institutions and experimenters. 
This expanded role occasionally decreases 
the protection afforded human subjects.
Even with the IRB watching over you, it's           
important to watch your back.
Data normalization is critical — but very hard.





We try to “normalize” by:
• Consistent containers
• Consistent file names & paths
Metadata normalization with Digital Forensics XML (DFXML)...
39
Lessons learned while 
writing digital forensic tools
DFXML
<dfxml>
Most DF tools act like “filters” or “extractors.”
They turn corpus bulk data into actionable intelligence.
It is not this simple in practice.
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TOOL STUFFDATA






















3 x 3 x 3 = 27 different outputs!






































DFXML (Digital Forensics XML) is an XML language for 






















DFXML provides metadata and provenance tracking.
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There’s lots of structured data to represent:
• File names, locations, MAC times, etc.
• Which program processed the data:
—Which version; where compiled, compiler flags, etc.
—Where it was run, how long it took, etc.
Originally programs kept this information in many different places:
• SleuthKit “body” file; Log files; Etc.
DFXML is a single, unified way of keeping all of this information.
• Arose out of personal need.
• Decided that it would be better not to reinvent a storage format.
• XML has broad support than other formats; tools for GB-sized objects
• Easiest way to get support for DFXML: add it to open source programs.






    <compiler>GCC 4.2</compiler>
    <compilation_date>2011-11-19T23:27:21</compilation_date>
    <library name="afflib" version="3.6.9"/>
    <library name="libewf" version="20100805"/>
  </build_environment>
  <execution_environment>
    <cpuid>
      <identification>GenuineIntel</identification>
      <family>6</family>
      <clflush_size>64</clflush_size>
      <nproc>16</nproc>
      <L1_cache_size>262144</L1_cache_size>
    </cpuid>
    <command_line>src/bulk_extractor -o dell1 4DellCPi.E01</command_line>
    <uid>501</uid>
    <username>simsong</username>




<fileobject> presents information about a file.
A “file” is a set of 0 or more bytes and metadata.
• File name, size, and hash codes.
• Physical Location on the disk.
• Provenance














   <byte_run file_offset='0' fs_offset='5577728' img_offset='5609984' len='32672'/>
  </byte_runs>
  <hashdigest type='md5'>bd1b0831fcba1f22eff2238da96055b6</hashdigest>
  <hashdigest type='sha1'>7e072af67f8d989cc85978487b948048ac3c7234</hashdigest>
</fileobject>
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A TCP flow is a file with <tcpflow> information.
  <fileobject>
    <filename>074.125.019.104.00080-192.168.001.102.50955</filename>
    <filesize>2792</filesize>





! srcport='80' dstport='50955' 
! family='2' out_of_order_count='3' />
  </fileobject>
  <fileobject>
    <filename>192.168.001.102.50955-074.125.019.104.00080</filename>
    <filesize>655</filesize>





! srcport='50955' dstport='80' 
! family='2' out_of_order_count='0' />
  </fileobject>
The <filename> is where the file’s bytes are in the file system.
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DFXML — the XML is the least important part.
Primary advantages:
• Non-experts can do forensics with tools that generate DFXML
Unexpected benefits:
• Makes it easier to replicate work — invoking command line in the XML
• Provides documentation to students
• N-version tool testing (use multiple tools to generate the same DFXML) 
Challenges and alternatives
• XML is verbose / inefficient; JSON is trendy
• Information could be stored in a SQLite database.
• Some users could benefit from provenance but don’t need <fileobject>s
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To spur use, we created libraries and added them to open 
source tools.





• Added DFXML support to hashdeep and photorec.
• Produced useful tools that require DFXML to operate
• Added example DFXML to Forensics Wiki
• Reached out to other projects with similar goals (MITRE CyBOX)
At the present time:
• We are using DFXML in our research
• DFXML makes it faster to do build, test and validate tools
—We learned an important site was using a 6-year-old C compiler...
DFXML is a research tool, but no longer a research subject.
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Conclusion
Digital forensics makes digital evidence 














Digital forensics — Hard problems that look easy
• We cover the entire stack (bits → OS & Apps→ 
supercomputers → Internet)
• We cover most domains of computer science (security; 
visualization; HLT)
Real Data Corpus — research with real data.
• It’s hard to get and work with real data
• Technical and legal issues
—legal issues are more difficult
Provenance tracking with DFXML
• Good technology isn’t enough
• Need, usability, and cost drive adoption
54
Digital forensics makes digital evidence 
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